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Juha-Pekka Rentto 
Professor Virginia Black addressed in Vol. 22 of this journal 
the question of whether Natural Law and individual rights are 
mutually compatible notions l . Her argument was aimed to show 
that they are. 1 shall undertake to argue that the interrelationship of 
the notions is by no means unproblematic. because Natural Law 
and natural rights are not just two different concepts. but they 
are the capstones of two (or several) radically different ways of 
thinking about matters moral and juridical. We shall proceed in 
three major steps. First we shall point out how thinking in terms of 
natural rights is radically different from thinking in terms of the 
Natural Law. Secondly we shall argue that Western moral and 
juridical thought is to-day divided in two different traditions 
precisely along the line between thinking in terms of natural rights 
and thinking in terms of Natural Law. Thirdly we shall consider 
Professor Black's attempt at reconciling the two traditions. 
hopefully showing that while her argument is not in itself 
successful. it is not necessarily misconceived. We shall then close 
discussion with a sketch on how we could pursue Black's ideas a 
1. Virginia BLACK, "On Connecting Natural Rights with Natural Law", 
Persona y Derecho (Vol. 22) 1990, pp. 183-209. 
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Httle further so as to show that the modem language of natural 
rights is perhaps deep down nothing but a way of applying the 
more fundamental and primary notion of Natural Law, whereby 
the division of traditions may tum out to cover a fundamental 
conceptual unity, after al!. 
In order to see why natural rights perhaps are not a universalIy 
valid moral or juridical notion, we shall begin by having a brief 
look at Westem and non-Westem approaches to the natural rights 
of individuals. In that context it will be argued that a broad 
dividing line can be drawn between Westem and non-Westem 
juridical thought with reference to radicalIy different conceptions of 
what an individual right consists in. These conceptions, I will 
argue, quite c1early depend on a fundamental difference about the 
concept of freedom, a concept essential to any understanding of 
individual rights. By and large, several non-Western cultures 
understand freedoin as a circumscribed freedom which consists in 
being free to do the right thing, whereas the modem paradigm of 
Westem thought conceives of freedom as a freedom of being at 
liberty to do what one will. To this difference corresponds a 
similar difference in the content ascribed to the notion individual 
right: For the Westem mind, an individual right is essentially a 
subjective right to be free from constraint. For many a non-
Westem mind an individual right can be nothing but that which is 
right for the individual; and as we shall see, what is right for an 
individual is not that he be at liberty to do whatever he will, but 
that he, of his own free will, complies his will to given constraints 
against doing the unsuitable or unreasonable thing. An individual 
right, on such a view, is a right to do what is appropriate for one to 
do. Where a1l this can be quite compatible with a notion of Natural 
Law, the applicability of the Westem concept of natural individual 
rights is problematic in that context. 
But the division is not merely between a Westem paradigm and 
several non-Westem cultures, but also between different Westem 
moral and juridical traditions: one important tradition of Westem 
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thought joins in fact ranks with the non-Western traditions where 
the notions of freedom and individual right are concerned. In one 
way this tradition can be characterized as the Catholic tradition, as 
the Catholic doctrine with its emphasis on the virtue of charity has 
for a long time been its valiant champion. In another way it can be 
broadly characterized as the Aristotelian-Thomasian tradition, as 
it builds on the moral rationalism of Aristotle and St. Thomas 
Aquinas. This tradition, while it must with aH reason be considered 
as the mother of aH theories of the Natural Law, faces great 
difficulties in incorporating the notion of individual natural rights 
in its conceptual apparatus2. The other Western tradition, which to-
day dominates the international discussion, can in one way be 
characterized as the utility tradition, with its emphasis on things 
secular, and on the acquisition of good things rather than on 
pesonal virtue. It can also be called the liberty tradition, as it places 
utmost importance on individual liberty, and precisely on the 
liberty of the individual will, whereby it is a voluntaristic rather 
than a rationalistic approach to morality and justice. Where this 
tradition has difficulties with the notion of Natural Law, it is 
the very cradle of aH ideas about natural human rights. The two 
traditions differ so radicaHy on so fundamental questions that it is 
difficult to see how they could be mutuaHy compatible in the way 
proposed by authors who wish to argue that natural rights are to be 
considered as pan of the very essence of the Natural Law itse1f3. 
Nevertheless, Virginia Black is convinced that even if natural 
rights c1early are not equivalent to the Natural Law4, the two 
notions are connected to each other. The general outcome of her 
discussion is that although one cannot be sure that there is a 
2. Even if it must be noted that the offieial Catholie ehurch has by now 
aeeepted the nolion of natural human rights as part of its social doctrine. 
3. As Blaek points ot, many authors have elaimed that natural rights are 
part and paree! of the Natural Law, without even trying to offer a solid 
foundalion for their claim, vide p. 200 pp. 
4. Vide p. 187. 
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conceptual connection between natural rights and the Natural Law, 
there are strong indications of one: the Natural Law perhaps 
provides for the true content of natural rights, which again are a 
way of putting the Natural Law into actual effect. 1 shall argue that 
Black's assertion is basically correct, but that it fails to fully 
appreciate one fundamental difference, a difference more essential 
than Black seems to acknowledge, between a natural rights ideo-
logy and a Natural Law ideology. Therefore 1 do not necessarily 
share Black's belief that the best way to teach the citizens to 
understand and follow the Natural Law is to teach them that it is 
the growing ground for their natural rights. 
1. "NATURAL RIGHTS" OUT OF PLACE 
One of the recurrent features of to-day's polítical discourse is 
that Westem spokesmen call for more natural, or human5, rights in 
the non-Westem world, while many non-Westem countries pay 
lip-service to the modem human rights ideology but continue to 
violate the Western conception of how they ought to be enforced. 
A cornmon explanation for this, in the Westem press and public 
opinion, is that these countries are underdeveloped in this precise 
respect: they are too poor, too uneducated, too uncivilized, too 
primitive, too traditional to be willing and able to respect the 
natural rights of their citizens. The patent solution that goes with 
this explanation is that the West should teach them to value, 
cherish and respect human rights, because it is for their own 
good6• 1 do not believe this to be the right (sic) solution. Quite on 
5. Rere 1 shall assume that "natural" and "human" rights are, for most 
practical purposes, synonymous, even if the two notions can be conceptually 
distinguished from one another. 
6. A typical representative of this way of thinking is Asbj0m Eide: 
Ihmisoikeuksien v1Uiset suhteet ja ihmisoikeuksien opettaminen, in Kansain-
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the contrary, the conceited West should realize that it has 
something important to learn from those non-Westem civilizations 
which have valíd reason for holding that the concept of natural 
rights ought not to be adopted, at least not in its paradigmatic 
Westem sense, because it is radically alíen and possibly delapi-
datory to their own integral worldview and morality7. In plain 
words, let us as sume that there is sorne substance, and not mere 
jealous opportunism and arrogant self-sufficience, to back up the 
words of a non-Westem spokesman when he points out to the 
unreceptive Westem audience that their way of understanding the 
rights of the individual human being have no place in his country. 
As Abraham Kaplan points out8, we should not begin with 
comparing our theory with their practice, or their theory with our 
practice, but with comparing our theory with their theory. Only if 
we find one of the theories better than the other, can we proceed to 
demand that those with the worse theory forsake it and conform 
their practice to the better one. In what follows, we shall have a 
brief look at a few theories of human nature and society which give 
reason to question the predominant Westem notion of individual 
valiset ihmisoikeudet (ed. Marjut Helminen & K. J. Ung), Lakimiesliiton 
kustannus, Manttit 1988, pp. 35-53. 
7. Cf. S. Prakash SINHA, "Human Rights: A Non-Westem Viewpoint", 
ARSP LXVII (1981), pp. 76-91, who in principie accepts the desirable idea of 
universally valid human rights but questions what he calls the "single-
catalogue approach", i. e. a way of approaching the problem via the false 
assumption that one single list of human rights, viz. the one agreed upon by 
the West, is right and there is only one right, i. e. Westem, interpretation of it. 
Sinha sees three altematives: (i) leave most of the world out of the human 
rights project because it cannot accept the one right catalogue; (ii) force those 
who cannot of their own will embrace the one right catalogue to accept it 
willy-nilly; (iii) realize that different cultures have legitimately different 
notions conceming what it means 10 set people free, and consequentIy allow 
different countries to act on their own interpretation of what natural rights 
consist in. See p. 88 pp. 
8. Abraham KAPLAN, "Human Relations and Human Rights in Judaism", 
in The Phi/osophy 01 Human Rights. International Perspectives (ed. Alan S. 
Rosenbaum), Aldwych Press, London 1981, pp. 53-85, see p. 53 p. 
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natural human rights, or at least its prevalent status as the paradigm 
of intemational moral discourse. The views I will present are of a 
necessity simplified, perhaps therefore even distorted, hut even as 
such they will show the essence of what makes the human rights 
approach to polítical moralíty a misfit in several cultural and 
philosophical contexts. We shall frrst look at the distinctIy non-
Westem worldviews of Islam, India and China, whereby we shall 
identify the crux of the difference between the West and the East. 
After that we shall take up certain traditional components of 
Westem thought, so as to show that the difference between East 
and West is also a difference within the Westem civilization. 
China 
If we look at the Chinese worldview, we find three major 
factors which have given form to it: the Tao, the Buddha, and 
Confucianism. Where Taoism is perhaps more interested in the 
metaphysical unity and harmony of all being, Confucianism 
focusses on the more practical matter of harmony between different 
kinds of persons, and Buddhism circles around the prospect of 
losing one's lower self and realizing one's true Self as one 
becomes a Buddha9• But all three have something very important 
in cornmon, viz. the central place the notion of harmony enjoys in 
each doctrine, be it harmony with the cosmos, with nature, with 
other people, with oneselflO. As a consequence, right action for a 
Chinaman is harmonious action, action which seeks reconciliation, 
9. Vide Peter K. Y. WOO, "A Metaphysical Approach to Human Rights 
from a Chinese Point of View", in The Pñilosophy 01 Human Rights (ed. 
Alan S. Rosenbaum), Aldwych Press, London 1981 (pp. 113-124), p. 114 p. 
10. Alongside with WOO,op. cit., vide S. Prakash SINHA, "Human 
Rights: A Non-Westem Viewpoint, p. 80 p. 
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peace, common acceptance and everyone's happinessll . Hence 
one ought not to assert oneself in order to seek one's own good or 
one's own right at the expense of others, not even if one were 
"right", as it were: the primary goal of resolving conflicts is to 
restore harmony, not to give each his right. Therefore in a conflict 
situation aH parties should strive to find fault in themselves, rather 
than in their adversaries, they should seek compromise and make 
concessions, rather than demands, and accept mediation, not 
adjudication, by someone elsel2. To resort to the law is shameful: 
as Sinha puts itl3, law is for "the morally perverse, the incorrigible 
criminal, and the foreigner who is alien to Chinese values"14. 
What is right is not at all important in comparison to what is 
proper, or appropriate, within the relevant group and in the 
particular kind of relationshipl5. 
11. woo,op. cit., p. 119; SINHA, loe. cit.; vide etiam Louis HENKIAN, 
"The Human Rights Idea in China", in R. Randle EDWARDS-Louis HEN-
KIN-Andrew J. NATHAN, Human Rights in Contemporary China, Columbia 
University Press, New York 1986 (pp. 7-39), p. 21. 
12. SINHA, p. 81. 
13. Ibidem. 
14. Cf. David B. WONG, Moral Relativity, University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984, at p. 198 pp., where the author argues that 
Taoism urges people to "forget" strict and rigorous moral rules so as to be able 
to approach moral conflicts in a way better adapted to the particular 
circumstances. 
15. Especially the central rOle of propriety, as opposed to justice, is also 
characteristic of the Japanese way or looking at things, which in many respects 
owes to a heavy Chinese influence. Vide SINHA, op. cit., p. 83 p. Of course, 
the hold of traditional thinking on the Japanese is to-day not quite so strong as 
on the Chinese, and it may be questioned if Sinha overstates his claim when he 
says that "the law (in Japan) ... governs a very sma1l segment of sociallife, ... 
namely middle class individuals fashioning their relations on the basis of 
freedom and liberty". But surely the old way of life is still predominant, and 
recent developments in the world, looked at from a Japanese perspective, may 
give reason to think that the latter-day Westernizing trend can be about to 
break. 
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Moreover, A Chinese person is always what he is because he 
belongs to given groups and has a given status in each one of 
them. Individuals live their lives through others, they exist for the 
group, and they cannot lead alife independent from family and 
community16. It follows from aH this that humility and compassion 
are the good characteristics of a human being: one must accept 
one's status and the duties that come with it, and one must always 
pay attention to the feelings of others. Duty is the primary moral 
category: according to the Four Steps of Confucius one has, frrst, 
the duty to cultivate oneself in virtue, secondly one has the duty to 
build a harmonious family, thirdly, if one has a status of authority, 
one has the duty to participate in the harmonious government of the 
people, and finalIy one has, if one is the Emperor, the duty 
virtously to govern the world for greater peace and harmony17. 
Thus duty to provide for others, according to the status one 
occupies18, rather than right to have and take, is the centrepiece of 
Chinese morality. How can a Western notion of inalienable 
individual rights, possessed and exercised against others and at the 
expense of others19, fit such a context where, as Woo points 
out20, "freedom to do what one likes (is) translated into the 
freedom to do what one does not like to do when a higher goal is 
to be obtained by a concern with the welfare of others"? 
IruJia 
In India, duty is also primary to rights. The Hindu world builds 
on a hierarchy of social groups where each kind of group and each 
16. WOO, p. 119 pp. 
17. WOO, p. 116. 
18. SINHA, p. 81. 
19. Vide Andrew LEVINE, "Human Rights and Freedom" , in The 
Philosophy 01 Human Rights (pp. 137-149)', p. 137 & p. 141 pp. where the 
author suggests that the predominant liberalistic notion of freedom tendsto 
reduce "others" to mere instruments to the ends of the agent. 
20. p. 121. 
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kind of relationship has its own rules of conduct defining the 
duties of a person in such-and-such a position. According to the 
Dharma, citizens have their civic duties, members of a given caste 
have their own duties, members of a family have their duties to the 
family, and non-Hindus have a different set of duties21 . Group 
membership is decisive, not individuality, and the basic unit of 
society still remains the lineage, or "joint-family"22 comprising 
several generations and also collateral relatives on the male side. 
Yet the Indian mind seems to be less tied to particular consi-
derations and immediate circumstances than the Chinese: it has a 
strong bent to a rational universalism, grounded in the strong 
Hindu philosophical tradition. 
The Indian universalism is reflected in the writings of authors 
like here quoted S. Prakash Sinha, and Ishwar C. Sharma, who 
advocates what he calls "comprehensive humanism" as opposed to 
Western religious and secular philosophies which look at human 
nature from overly restricted and even schizophrenic viewpoints23. 
What is important for him is the whole man, not just his social, 
political, economic, or religious part, and aman is whole when he 
is at harmony with himself and the world, i. e. when he is a good 
and benevolent person24• Respect instead ofrights is the password 
of comprehensive humanism: before you can elaim a right to live 
you must respect life, before you can elaim a right to property you 
must respect property, before you can elaim a right to express your 
thoughts you must respect everyone's thoughts. Out of respect 
grows a will to fulfil one's duty to others voluntarily. If that 
happens, one's personality becomes integrated, and one reaches 
true freedom, the freedom of mind unfettered by selfish and 
21. SINHA, p. 87. 
22. Ibídem, p. 88. 
23. Ishwar C. SHARMA, "Human Rights and Comprehensive Humanism", 
in The Phílosophy o[ Human Ríghts, pp. 103-112. 
24. SHARMA, p. 110. 
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improper considerations25. It is doubtful whether such a freedom 
could properly be promoted by a conflict-oriented Western notion 
of natural individual rights which demands that rights-owners 
defend their own claims frrst, even at the expense of others. 
Islam 
In Islam, too, duty is paramount to right26, perhaps even more 
markedly than in China and India. After aH, the very notion of 
Islam signifies submission to the Divine will. As Seyyed H. Nasr 
points out, the Islamic concept of freedom does not consist in a 
freedom to do what one likes or wishes to do, but in a freedom 
"from aH external conditions, including those of the carnal soul..., 
which press upon and limit one's freedom. Pure freedom belongs 
to God alone; therefore the more we are, the more we are free"27. 
In other words, freedom means godlike independence from the 
world, and men realize their freedom by becoming more adquate 
images of their Creator. Nasr continues: "To rebel against our own 
ontological PrincipIe in the name of freedom is to become enslaved 
to an ever greater degree in the world of multiplicity and 
limitation"28. Rights, in order to make fuH sense in this context, 
can hardly be like their Western prototypes, set on having things 
rather than on being what a human being is to be, i. e. a fuHy 
human persono 
The Islamic ideal of human society is also cornmunitarian rather 
than individualistic: according to one of the fathers of arabic social 
philosophy, AI-Farabi, who wrote in the 10th century and was 
influenced by both Aristotle and Plato, the ideal state is a 
25. Ibidem. 
26. Vide SINHA, p. 86. 
27. Seyyed H. NASR, "The Concept and Reality of Freedom in Islam and 
Islamic Civilization", The Philosophy oi Human Rights, (pp. 95-101), p. 96. 
28. Ibidem. 
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coordinated organism where each member has a place and a job to 
do, and which job it is everyone's duty to perform29• Later, Ibn 
Khaldun, who in the 14th century entertained "realistic" ideas 
somewhat reminiscent of Macchiavelli, argued that the reason for 
the destruction of overripe states was their degeneration due to 
easy life in great welfare which delapidated the nomadic 
communitarian virtues that still held the young and victorious states 
tight1y together30. 
Islam has a greater belief than the other oriental cultures we 
have considered in the importance of Law, necessary for the 
creation and maintenance of social coordination. But the Islamic 
lawyers find obligation and duty primary to rights, and for them, 
the fundamental task of the law is to set men free from the world, 
free in an inner sense, rather than in an outer sense of being free in 
the world31 . On the other hand, Islamic theologians and philo-
sophers are often at a difference concerning the question of human 
freedom: sorne theological schools are deterministic, whereas 
philosophical authors like A vicenna, A verroes and A vempace, join 
the Greek tradition which emphasizes the freedom of human will. 
But even for the philosophers the ultimate warrant for human 
freedom is submission to the Divine wiIl which liberates men from 
the close confines of their carnal passions32. As a con sequen ce, 
whatever rights individual men may have, they must be for the 
purpose of gaining immortal beatitude rather than wordly well-
being. That end is quite alien at least to the liberalistic brand of 
Western natural rights ideology. 
29. Vide AbduIkader IRABI, "Zur Geschichte und Gegenwart arabischer 
Sozialphilosophie und Soziologie", ARSP LXVII (1981), pp. 176-196, 
p. 178 p. 
30. Vide ibidem, p. 181 pp. 
31. NASR, p. 97. 
32. Ibidem, p. 98 p. 
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Summary 
To c10se our discussion of extra-European cultures33 we shall 
try to fonnulate what is in common between them but at a 
difference with the predominant Westem natural rights thinking. 
Sinha sees three components34: 1) The Westem human rights 
ideology is individualistic, whereas the non-Westem ideologies are 
group-oriented or outright communitarian. 2) The Westem human 
rights ideology believes in the primacy of rights, whereas the non-
Western ideologies consider duty and obligation the centrepieces of 
morality. 3) The way of resolving conflicts according to the 
Westem human rights ideology is to make legal c1aims and resort 
to legal adjudication, whereas the non-Western ideologies seek 
hannony and reconciliation through mediation, education and 
repentance. Another way of putting the same thing would be to say 
that the West concentrates on having and getting whatever is there 
to grab according to the rights one possesses much in the same 
way as one possesses one's private property; whereas the East is 
primarlIy concemed with being or getting to be in a proper state of 
harmony with one's self, with one's group, with one's govern-
ment, with nature, and with the universe. 
I will not propose to defend the claim that the East is right and 
the West is wrong. Suffice it to say that clearly the East has a 
reasonable case, and the West is obliged to ground its c1aim to 
ideological supremacy with a substantial metaphysical and moral 
argument. It is not enough to point a relentless finger at 
"traditionalism" and c1aim that as the non-Westem doubts about 
33. It would be instructive to look at Africa, too, where the general 
judgment has it that the local cultures are highly family-oriented, commu-
nitarian, and look for reconciliation in conflict situations rather than for a 
judicial statment of who is right and who is wrong. Vide SINHA, p. 84, p. But 
African tribes, each with its own tradidions and its own morality, are a legion, 
wherefore it is even more out of place than it is where China, India and Islam 
are concemed, 10 make sweeping generalizations about them. 
34. SINHA, p. 77 and p. 88 pp. 
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natural rights are traditional, they are for that same reason irrational 
and unacceptable as valid arguments in the international human 
rights discourse. As Louis J. Munoz points out, it is a post-
Weberian prejudice to hold tradition irrational: traditions are not 
followed blindly, they are continuously accepted (and modified) 
because they are continuously found an adequate way of coping 
with the problems confronted by the members of the tradition35. 
The difference between adopting a traditional stand and a Western 
"scientific" stand is that the former is a personal choice reflecting a 
tacit rationality, where the latter is an impersonal choice reflecting 
an explicit rationality36. Besides, what more can the Western 
rationality with is natural rights ideology be but - a tradition among 
other traditions. 
2. THE DIVISION OF THE WEST 
At the core of the different cultural approaches to human nor-
mativity is the concept of freedom: morality and law become 
necessary only because human beings are free to act according to 
their personal choice. Different understandings of the concept of 
freedom malee up major divisions between the different outlooks to 
life. The internationalIy predominant Western natural rights tra-
dition builds on a notion of freedom which can be loosely 
characterized as liberal: not libertarian, or liberalistic in a narrow 
sense, but liberal because of its emphasis on freedom defined as a 
state of being at liberty to act as one will. On this conception, 
freedom is a concept defined with primary reference to the will: 
one is free when one can exercise one's will at liberty, i. e. when 
one can without undue restraint do what one wants or needs to 
35. Louis J. MUNOZ, "The Rationality of Tradition", ARSP LXVII 
(1981), pp. 197-216, vide p. 207 p. 
36. Ibidem, p. 207 pp. 
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d037. It is a natural (sic) corollary of accepting such a conception 
of freedom that one also accepts the view that in order to realize 
one's freedom one ought to have the right to do what one will 
without undue heteronomous normative restrictions or other 
external hindrances. Autonomy, in other words, consists in one's 
fundamental right to act at will, whatetever it is one may will, as 
long as it will not unduly affect the like freedom of others. It is a 
right to be let alone by the others, to make claims and litigate when 
one's rights are violated, to defend one's existing rights and to 
acquire new ones, to demand respect from others. The basic moral 
assumption behind it is that if one wants freely what one wants, 
one's will merits moral respect, whatever its object my be: 
therefore it is morally not only admissible but al so primafacie right 
and even laudable that one does what one wants. A myth built up 
to support this assumption is that all human beings equally have a 
certain natural worth or dignity, which their acts of will reflect and 
realize. 
The non-Western viewpoints reviewed aboye represent a 
different understanding of the concept of freedom. If we look 
away from the different nuances, which are not insignificant, we 
can discern something essentially common in the way China, the 
Subcontinent, and Islam, look at freedom: freedom is not to be 
realized by being at liberty to act as one may wish, but by being 
free to act in an appropriate manner, i. e. by freely submitting to 
the constraints put on by one's social position and circumstances. 
In this sense, freedom consists in a free acceptance of the fact that 
one cannot do what one may want or need to do just because one 
37. A prototype example of a proponent of such a conception of freedom is 
Carol C. GOULD, Rethinking Democracy. Freedom and social cooperation in 
politics. economy. and society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, 
vide especialIy p. 43 pp. where she levels her argument against what she calls 
"traditional conceptions of freedom". For a comment, vide RENfTO, Match or 
Mismarriage? A Study on Ontological Realism and Law. Acta Societatis 
Fennicae luris Gentium CI, Helsinki 1992, p. 163 pp. 
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wants or needs to do so, because there are good reasons against it. 
In this loose sense38, the non-Western traditions can be said to 
build on a notion of freedom primarily defined by the reason: one 
is free when one submits to good reasons. The freedom one then 
enjoys is not freedom to act and to have, but freedom to be human, 
i. e. independent of the subhuman world, liberated from uncon-
trolled and unreasonable passions which can enslave the human 
soul and undo the position of man as master over himself. Man has 
a place and a mission within the universe, a task 10 fulfil, and so as 
to be free, the individual person must submit to that position, 
accept the mission, and undertake to accomplish the task. In this 
sense freedom consists in an autonomous submission to an order: 
by submitting to it one legislates for oneself the law which governs 
the universe. For this reason we can loosely characterize the 
common denominator of the non-Western traditions as a Natural 
Law tradition. 
The West has also a long history of thinking in terms of Natural 
Law rather than natural rights, which are a relatively novel 
invention39. Next it will be our task to investigate the Western 
Natural Law tradition in order to see how compatible it is with the 
Western natural rights tradition. The notion of Natural Law lives in 
the West most strongly together with the Christian element of the 
occidental tradition, influenced by Judaism as well as by Platonism 
(through Augustinianism) and Aristotelianism (through Thomism). 
The Catholic church has long been an adamant defender of Natural 
38. Loase because e. g. Islam, as we have pointed out, has a voluntaristic 
tendency to express the good reason not to act as one wants in terms of God's 
will rather than reason. 
39. Vide e. g. Ralph MCINERNY, "Natural Law and Natural Rights", The 
American Journal 01 Jurisprudence, 36 (1991), pp. 1-14, where the author 
without preliminaries proceeds from the assumption that there are two Westem 
traditions: the naturallaw tradition and the human rights tradition. 
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Law doctrine, reluctant to accept a human rights doctrine with a 
whole hearr40• That there is even to-day a lively discussion among 
Catholic and non-Catholic philosophers on whether it is appro-
priate to infer natural human rights from the Natural Law, or 
whether the two notions are incompatible or at least independent 
from each other, shows that there is a substantial issue here to be 
settled, just as it shows that the West is not unanimous in its 
worldwide prograrnme for an undiscriminate promotion of natural 
human rights41 . 
The gist of the Catholic Natural Law philosophy is that God has 
in creation assigned to each being, including man, its nature. This 
nature is normative in the sense that it defines the ideal perfection 
of the being in question, which it is to seek during its existence so 
as to fulfil God's creation for its own parto In order to be a good 
being of its kind, it must act according to its nature, i. e. seek its 
own kind of perfection which differentiates it from all other kinds 
of creatures and reflects its specific place and task in the grand 
order of the universe. A standard argument forwarded by those 
Catholic theologians and philosophers who argue for human 
natural rights within this scheme is that man was created to the 
image of God, wherefore he possesses a share of God's dignity: 
each man has an intrinsic worth, he is an end in himself, and 
40. In 1790, pope Pius VI condemned the French declaration of human 
rights. Only in 1891, pope Leo XIII affirmed the notions of human dignity and 
human rights in the encyc1ical Rerum novarum, see Reginaldo M. PIZZORNI, 
"Persona umana e diritti dell'uomo", Persona y Derecho, 28 (1993) (pp. 85-
119), p. 91. To-day, the official church speaks about human rights quite 
unreservedly, for an example see ibidem p. 85. Nevertheless, the church is 
aware of the problems of the liberal conception of human rights, and her 
understanding of human rights is necessari1y different, due 10 the fact that their 
foundation is explicit1y sought in God's creation. 
41. For sorne deviant views, vide Virginia BLACK, op. supra cit., p. 183 
pp. 
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therefore he is entitled to personal respect and to an individual 
freedom to make his own life42. A similar argument is, quite 
naturally, invoked by Jewish human rights theorists43. 
A great believer in the human rights within the Natural Law 
tradition was Jacques Maritain who more or less thought that the 
modern human rights catalogues like the one in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 were the proper content of 
the Natural Law in modern times44. Another author who claims 
that natural rights doctrine simply is the appropriate Natural Law 
theory is Felicien Rousseau45. A third spokesman for at least the 
language of natural rights within the Natural Law tradition is John 
Finnis46. But he makes an important difference between substance 
and language: for him, the natural rights are not the Natural Law, 
but, as Mc Inerny points out, he thinks we can more eloquently, 
more precisely, and more discriminately "say all we have to say 
using rights talk alone"47. To Finnis we shall return at the close of 
this essay. 
Most prominent among those whodeny every connection 
between the Natural Law and the modern natural rights are Michel 
42. vide e. g. R. J. HENLE, S. J., "A Catholic View of Human Rights: A 
Thomistic Reflection", The Phi/osophy 01 Human Rights (pp. 87-93), p. 88 
p.; etiam PIZZORNI: op. cit. p. 116 pp. 
43. Vide Abraham KAPLAN, "Human Relations and Human Rights in 
Judaism", ibidem (pp. 53-85), p. 54 pp. 
44. Maritain's statement is to be found e. g. in MARITAIN, Man and the 
State, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1951. For brief comments, 
vide MAClNERNY, op. supra cit. p. 4 pp., and BLACK, op. cit. p. 201 p. 
45. Felicien ROUSSEAU, La croissance solidaire des droits de l'homme: un 
rétour aux sources de l'éthique, 1982, commented by MCINERNY, op. cit. 
p. 9 p. 
46. John FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1980, p. 198 pp.; vide etiam idem, Natural Inclinations and Natural 
Rights: Deriving "Ought" from "Is" According to Aquinas, in Lex et Libertas. 
Freedom and Law According to Sto Thomas Aquinas (ed. L. J. Elders S. V. D. 
& K. Hedwig), pp. 43-55. 
47. MC INERNY, op cit. p. 8. 
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Villey and Leo Strauss who hold that the modero natural rights 
doctrine is essentially different from the classical theory of Natural 
Law, being a result of a radical shift in what is meant by the 
concept of "right". Villey argues that "right" in the classical Natural 
Law doctrine means more or less "the right thing", a meaning 
essentially different from "right" as in human rights48. Strauss, on 
the other hand, sees the natural rights as something essentially 
Robbesian, requiring the assumption that the basis of all morality 
is the human desire for self-preservation, whereas the classical 
Natural Law had nothing to say about any individual rights49• 
Arguments like Villey's and Strauss' appeal to historical purity 
of tradition. More interesting for our purposes are arguments 
forwarded by authors who see that Natural Law and natural rights 
are different things, but nevertheless believe it worth while to make 
an attempt at joining or reconciling the two notions. In this group 
we have the official Catholic church, together with Father Renle 
and Professor Pizzoroi. A scrutiny of their way of circumscribing 
the scope of natural rights is quite instructive as it reveals just how 
far the Natural Law tradition is able to accommodate the modero 
notion of natural human rights. 
Renle points out that human rights must be put "into the 
background of human relationships"50: if one were alone, what 
significance would rights have? What is more, rights are legal 
concepts and fictions, designed for a practical purpose of dealing 
with certain public aspects of human relationships. Rights identify 
and crystallize these aspects and make them more susceptible of 
being organized in an orderly way. But they should never be 
separated from the fundamental context of interpersonal relations . 
and their equitableness: they must always be considered as 
expressions for the more basic notion of interpersonal justice, 
which, again, covers the entire field of human intepresonal 
48. Vide ibidem p. 1 p. 
49. For a discussion, vide BLACK, op_ cit., p. 183 p. 
50. HENLE,op. cit. p. 89 pp. 
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morality, the morality about things and actions. This public sphere 
of morality demands that different persons be in a right relationship 
to one another. This relationship is reciprocal, and proportionate. 
In other words, people are in a right relationship when they are in a 
proper proportion to each other. Against this background, rights 
must be seen as rights to right proportions between men, not as 
rights to things or actions as such. The right proportion is not an 
equality of amounts, but it consists in the respective persons 
occupying the po si tion s that are rightfuHy theirs. Thus different 
kinds of proportionalities obtain between citizen and state, 
individual and individual, individual and community. And what is 
important, there is no principial conflict between the good of the 
individual and the good of the community: the true common good 
is the good of each and aH, and the true good of each and every 
one is good for the community. If rights are to be used aright, they 
must be aimed at the "objective iustum -the right relationship 
between men with reference to goods and actions". 
Where Henle's key concept is "right relationship", Pizzorni's is 
"person": the human being is a person in analogy to the Persons of 
the Holy Trinity, and the dignity of the human person derives from 
its similitude to God in its rationality and freedom of will51• The 
Natural Law is an objective order giving man his rational and free 
nature, enjoining him to act aright. i. e. according to his nature52• 
On the contrary, the modern secular conception of human rights is 
subjective: man is the creator of the order, not its subject. In order 
to understand rights aright, this subjective approach must be 
surpassed. This can only be done if we anchor human rights is 
God's eternal law which defines the world order and aH the 
different natures of the things it encompasses53. But even if it is 
God who defines man, among other natures, and not man himself, 
man's freedom is not diminished: human autonomy does not 
51. PIZZORNI,op. cit., p. 87 pp. 
52. Ibídem p. 98. 
53. p.99. 
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consist in a rejection of all "heteronomus", norms, but in one's 
free acceptance ofthe Natural Law, whereby the human person is 
not enslaved but liberated. And each person, as a participant of the 
divine providence, is himself responsible for his own liberation, 
sibi ipsi providens54. As a consequence it is the responsibility of 
each and every one to make God's law one's own, to legislate it to 
oneself. In this precise sen se, the individual person is "a law unto 
himself", as Sto Paul states. This law is identified by the 
conscience in its judgments55. Thus man participates in his own 
creation by discovering his own essence and growing to be more 
fulIy human and with a more perfect similitude to God as he 
realizes his nature by his own free will. In this way he grows in 
his free rationality, and becomes an authentic autonomous person 
in the full sense of the word56. Now persons are not for the 
society, but society is for the flourishing of personhood57: The 
point of organized society is the common good, which is the good 
of each and every citizen. Therefore the state ought to serve the 
purpose of facilitating the growth of individual citizens to full 
personhood. This can only happen if the citizens are fully allowed 
to as sume their re spon sibilit y fo their own lives. For this reason, 
the state as well as the fellow citizens owe respect to the individual 
person and his dignity as co-author with God. Rights are 
corollarles of this duty to respect the individual person who, and 
who alone, can bear responsibility for his own action for the 
common good of al!. For this purpose, and for it alone, human 
rigths "individuate elements in which they reinforce the vigor and 
efficacy of the very tradition of Christian values"58. 
These two arguments, while they explicitIy support natural 
human rights, reveal a strong apprehension of using the notion of 
54. p. 100 p. 
55. p. 102. 
56. P. 105. 
57. p. 107 pp. 
58. p. 115. 
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natural rights in an inappropriate manner. If it is to be understood 
correctly it must be subordinated to more fundamental moral con-
siderations: rights cannot be ultimate grounds for morality, as the 
ultimate ground is human nature, created by God. And it is part 
and parcel of this nature, social and rational as the tradition has it, 
that individual human beings enter into relationships with each 
other. In these relationships each individual has a role, and justice 
requires that each individual occupies the roles that properly belong 
to him in right proportion to those other individuals with whom he 
enters into relationships. Rightness is right proportion, and one's 
individual rights must be seen against this very background as 
rights to actualize the right proportion, not against others but to 
them59. Morally fundamental in this context is that each individual 
human being is responsible for himself: he enjoys moral freedom 
and must provide for himself, make his own life and give form to 
his own personality by making autonomous moral choice s which 
grow into a habit of virtue or vice. This responsibility entails a 
moral obligation to act according to one's nature if one is to 
become a fully human person, i. e. to actualize the fulllikeness of 
God imprinted on one in creation. It is up to each individual to do 
so for his own parto This, as Pizzomi would put it, is a duty to 
God from whieh the human rights follow, and beeause of it those 
rights are not our private property to use as we please but 
inviolable obligations towards ourselves, our neighbours and our 
creator60• Duty, obligation, and responsibility, then, take prece-
denee before rights. And even when we owe respeet to each other 
in our mutual capaeity of becoming fully human persons, it is not 
essentially the faet of being respeeted that eontributes to a 
persons's moral growth but the faet that he respeets himself as well 
as his fellows as living images of God. It is morally more laudable 
59. To give a striking example: if propoetionality eequires that someone 
who has committed a crime is to be punished in a certain way, it is his right to 
be punished because it is the right thing foe him. 
60. vide PIZZORNI, op. cit. p. 108 p. 
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to suffer wrong in humility and charity than to rise in revolution or 
to cry out loud for one's rights61 • 
The Catholic Natural Law tradition is c1early uneasy about 
natural rights. The Catholic starting points, with their emphasis on 
"right relationship", "proportionality", "responsibility" and "duty" 
are quite close to the non-Westem traditions we have considered. 
Like them, the Catholic Natural Law tradition holds that man is 
part and parcel of a universal order to which he is subject. Like 
them, it believes that the essence of human freedom consists in 
one's free submission to the dictates of natural reason, not in one's 
being at liberty to do whatever one may happen to wish62. 
Therefore it meets with the same problems as the Chinese, Indian 
and Islamic traditions do when its children seek to embrace the 
modern notion of human rights. Nevertheless, many have wel-
comed it as part of the very teaching of the Catholic church. Are 
those who argue for human natural rights as requirements of the 
Natural Law being inconsistent when they seek to sustain both 
traditions at the same time? To this question Virginia Black has 
answered a cautious "no", which it is next our task to evaluate. 
61. Pizzomi (p. 117 p.) quotes a document entitled "Orientamenti per lo 
studio e l'insegnamento della dottrina sociale della Chiesa nella formazione 
sacerdotale (30 dicembre 1988), n. 4, published in a Supplement to "L'Osser-
vatore romano", June 28 1989: "(i diritti umani) lo ha fatto pero non nel 
contesto du un'opposizione rivoluzionaria dei diritti della persona contro le 
autoritA tradizionali, ma sullo sfondo del Diritto iscritto dal Creatore nella 
naturale umana". - Vide etiam MACINERNY, op. supra cit. p. 12 pp., which is 
more openly critical of the "conversion" of church representatives to a modem 
pluralistic, claims-oriented human rights ideology. 
62. Vide Horst SEIDL, "Sittliche Freiheit und Naturgesetz bei Thomas 
angesichts des modemen Gegensatzes von Autonomie und Heteronomie", Lex 
et Libertas. Freedom and Law According to Sto Thomas Aquinas (ed. L. J. 
Elders S.V.D. & K. Hedwig), Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso, Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, Citta del Vaticano 1987, pp. 113-124, where the author 
explains how the Law of Nature is a natural condition for, and not a 
heteronomous limitation to, moral freedom 
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3. PROFESSOR BLACK'S ARGUMENT: A BRIDGE OVER THE 
DMDE? 
Not herself a member of the Catholic Natural Law tradition, 
Professor Virginia Black has in this journal63 outlined an 
unpretentious defense of an important connection between natural 
rights and Natural Law, which is noteworthy and interesting 
precisely because it is so modestIy devoid of grand vocabulary and 
solemn invocations to self-evident truths. Her starting point is the 
insight that natural rights and Natural Law clearly are different 
things: The Natural Law is a doctrine of duty and obligation 
whereas natural rights are an "inalienable possession with which 
(we) can do things"64. The two notions are not identical, as it is 
obvious that duties and rights do not always entail or require each 
other65. Therefore we must accept that Natural Law and natural 
rights are, in the abstract, conceptually distinct from one another. 
But despite this they may have a lot in common which makes them 
a good match. 
Black puts forward six different criticisms of a supposed 
connection between natural rights and Natural Law. The first 
criticism points out that a Natural Law doctrine must always be 
community oriented, whereas the natural rights ideology circ1es 
around the individual. Black's answer is that rights are social, too, 
because they presuppose the presence of others, wherefore natural 
rights are necessarily incompatible with Natural Law only if they 
are based on a Hobbesian egoism which reduces morality to a mere 
instrumentality for self-preservation66. This, according to Black, is 
not the case where the predominant natural rights doctrine is 
concemed. 
63. BLACK, op. supra cit. 
64. BLACK, p. 187. 
65. p. 188. 
66. p. 189 p. 
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A second criticism appeals to the latter day extension of rights to 
include specific entitlements to determinate things, which the 
Naturál Law doctrine rather includes within the sphere of duty 
and obligation. At stake here are the so called positive rights to 
goods redistributed by the state. The scope and number of such 
entitlement-rights "have exploded out of all proportion and 
feasibility", Black concedes, but points out at the same time that 
conventional positive rights accorded by a state to its citizens 
should not affect one's consideration of the natural rights doctrine, 
a doctrine of universal morality. The positive entitlements can well 
be incompatible with the Natural Law, but this will not entail that 
natural rights must be so, to067. 
A third criticism can be construed with reference to the apparent 
fact that modem rights doctrine would seem to override our moral 
obligations, which puts traditional Christian charity and relief work 
into a danger of extinction: voluntary obligations cannot in the long 
run compete with legally enforcible rights. Black's answer seems 
to be that it is only natural that virtue cannot be legally enforced: 
wherever there is law, it must also compete with the voluntary 
virtue of its subjects. Nevertheless, even if the Natural Law 
doctrine holds the virtues dear, sorne of its basic tenets like "do no 
harm to others" are beyond any doubt legally enforcible68. 
A fourth criticism points out that rights are usually defined by 
the rOles of their carriers: a person in a given position has a given 
competence of rights. But natural rights must be something 
different, because they are claimed to be universal. Therefore the 
question rises if they can be properly rights at aH. To this Black 
replies that rights can indeed only be perfet, i. e. securely 
enforcible and protected, when tightly connected with given 
individuals in their given roles. Only positive legal rights can 
strictly speaking be such. But the fact that natural rights cannot be 
67. p.190p. 
68. p. 191 p. 
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perfect rights in that sense will not affect the chances of a natural 
rights doctrine to acquire the status of a moral doctrine with 
universal validity. And she continues to argue that a natural rights 
doctrine is patent1y useful as a way of judicializing universal moral 
considerations, i. e. of putting fundamental non-positive moral 
arguments in judiciable terms more readi1y susceptible of dis-
cussion and consideration in the courtroom69. 
A fifth criticism builds on the insight that a knowledge of what 
natural rights we may have will not tell us what is good for uso 
This may lead to an egoistic and immoral misuse of rights, which 
also contributes to a stready growth of selfishness, accompanied 
by a widespread acceptance of the idea that it is morally appro-
priate, laudable, even obligatory, to think and act for one's selfish 
interest because it is one's civic duty to stand upon one's rights. 
This goes directly against the aspirations of a Natural Law doc-
trine. Black retorts that, again, the pessimistic outcome claimed 
here cannot result from a natural rights doctrine alone, but only if it 
is combined with an undesirable moral attitude. The proper answer 
to the problem is not to discard natural rights but to invest in moral 
education, so that the carriers of natural rights learn to use them for 
doing the right things rather than for cultivating a wanton self-
indulgence 70. 
Finally, a sixth criticism has it that the natural rights doctrine 
unduly looks away from the divine origin of the natural morality, 
an origin supposedly essential to Natural Law doctrine. The 
obvious answer given by Black to this criticism is that already the 
history of ancient Greek philosophy shows that there is no reason 
why Natural Law could not be based on secular considerations. 
Indeed a great deal of its strength Hes in the fact that it does not 
entirely depend on a supernatural crutch: the crux of the Natural 
Law is, after all, nature, not nature's author71 . 
69. p. 192 p. 
70. p. 194. 
71. p. 194 pp. 
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1 find most of the criticisms identified by Black important and 
valid in the sense that they point to significant problems which the 
natural rights doctrine must face and solve if it is to be taken 
seriously as a universally valid moral doctrine. 1 also find most of 
Black's rejoinders valid in the sense that they show the ways in 
which solutions to these problems can be found. For the purposes 
of this essay we shallleave the sixth criticism from religion as it is, 
well satisfied by Black's argument. To the subject matter of the 
fourth criticism from the imperfection of natural rights, which we 
will not evaluate more closely in itself, we shall return at the close 
of this essay. But criticism one, two, three and five are too easily 
dismissed by Black: 1 believe there is something in them she 
misses or overlooks. What it is will hopefully become clear as we 
consider the argument she proceeds to unfold in order to show that 
there is an important connection between natural rights and Natural 
Law. 
Natural Law and natural rights have a lot in common, Black 
observes: they deal with the same things, they impose much the 
same moral constraints on action, they are both teleological at the 
core, seeking moral and intellectual improvement, both build on 
human autonomy, both restrict state authority, both laya claim to 
immutability and universality of application, etc. But to have many 
things in common does not mean that the concepts in question are 
interchangeable, or that Naturallaw and natural rights are mutually 
necessary or otherwise foHow from each other72. Yet Black 
believes that aH the things the two notions have in common are 
fairly convincing evidence that their mutual relationship is more 
than accidental. Looking for binding evidence, she goes on to 
consider several openings. 
Black begins with the argument that if the Natural Law is to 
work in a society, it requires that people be "free and rational to 
exercise their capacity for moral judgment". Now this freedom is 
72. p. 203 p. 
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ostensibly guaranteed by the natural rights. Thus it seems to follow 
that these rights are a necessary prerequisite of the efficacy of the 
Natural Law73 . Black refutes this argument quite correctIy by 
pointing out that political freedom in the sen se of freedom from 
undue restraint and oppression is not at aH the same thing as the 
freedom required by the Natural Law, which is a freedom of the 
will to act according to reason. One need not live in a free society 
in order to be a good person and act aright. - Another opening for 
a strong connection Black finds in the implicit teleology of both the 
Natural Law and the natural rights: that they both aspire to a 
personal improvement of the members of society74. But even this 
approach, while it is c1ear that the natural rights can causally 
reinforce the Natural Law and facilitate its success, has a major 
shortcoming in that the causal relationship is merely contingent: 
from natural rights will not necessarily foHow an improvement of 
morality and e. g. communal caring. As Black puts it, "it seems 
that something else has also to be in place ... that ... is not 
obviously or instantaneously available to us". This something else 
is the factor which makes us choose the right goals, as the natural 
rights in themselves "leave us free to choose our goals"75. The 
meaning of this last phrase is ambiguous: does it mean that we are 
free to choose between goals which are our goals with a natural 
necessity, i. e. between things naturaHy good for us, or does it 
mean that we are free to choose which things are good for us and 
which are bad? Is it our choice which makes things good for us, or 
are they good or evil independently of our choice? This key 
question strongly suggests that, contrary to what Black appears to 
believe76, the natural rights tradition builds upon a human nature 
73. p. 204 p. 
74. p. 205 p. 
75. p.206. 
76. Vide p. 203 where she simply asserts that both ideas are based on 
human nature. The question is, what kind of human nature they are based on, 
and whether it is the same nature in both cases. 
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which may be quite different from the one used by the Natural Law 
tradition, because it conceives of the human freedom in a very 
different way. 
A third opening can be seen in what Black calls the Aristotelian 
mode of construing the Natural Law as the essential social 
constants of our associationallife, e. g. natural justice. From this 
viewpoint it can be argued that where the Natural Law defines the 
obligations of the members of the political community as 
something we have a natural inclination to perform, the natural 
rights reflect the Natural Law and put it into operation as a moral 
law, protecting these natural inclinations from intrusion77. But 
again Black points out that a mere similarity of function will not of 
itself constitute a conceptual connection between the Natural 
Law and the natural rights. Instead, she sees a more promising 
approach in a fourth way of putting the problem: the Natural Law 
should be understood as directive of not seeking our own 
individual goals alone but also to help others to seek theirs. In this 
other-directed aspect of the Natural Law, respect for the freedom 
of others is essential, and this respect is readily definable as a 
respect for the natural human rights of one's fellows. In this way 
the natural rights become a function of the Natural Law, being an 
expression for it normativity. If so, natural rights are with no 
doubt fully compatible with the Natural Law. 
Black is right to a point: it is quite sensible to claim that there is 
an important connection between Natural Law and natural rights 
because both notions circle around the concept of human freedom. 
A fundamental presupposition as well as the final goal of the 
Natural Law is human freedom, and the human rights help indi-
vidual human beings to attain and to exercise human freedom. 
Therefore it is only natural to hold that the Natural Law enjoins us 
to respect and cherish the rights of mano In other words we have at 
hand a practical syllogism which concludes that if human beings 
77. p. 206 p. 
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are to be free, it is practically necessary for us to hold that the 
Natural Law requires them to enjoy certain rights which we call 
natural or human. But if the syllogism is to be valid, the meaning 
of "freedom" must be the same throughout the syIlogism. This 
condition does not necessarily hold. 
"Freedom" as a presupposition of the Natural Law refers to 
the metaphysical notion of freedom as an ontological fact of the 
human nature: the human being is such that it is not, contrary to 
other beings, fully predetermined to any single goal or action. The 
make-up of human nature is simply such that it is up to each 
individual human person to make up his own mind as to what he is 
to do. Human rights cannot affect this fundamental freedom in any 
way whatsoever78. "Freedom" as the goal of the Natural Law 
refers to something else: that freedom consists in personal 
autonomy, i. e. in an actualized full freedom of the will, which 
from a different angle is equivalent to a full subjection of the will to 
the directions of right reason. If the practical syllogism is to be 
true, natural human rights must promote freedom in precisely this 
sense of personal autonomy. Whether they do, depends. If we 
give a new look at the objections so easi1y discarded by Black to 
the compatibility of natural rights with the Natural Law, we shall 
find that thinking in terms of natural rights has certain features 
which tend to block rather than help the actualization of full 
personal autonomy. Whether these tendencies can be removed, is 
arguable. 
Black says that the predominant natural rights ideology is not 
Hobbesian and amoral79. But I believe she overlooks that thinking 
in terms of natural rights is ingeniously adaptable to the naturalistic 
morality which equates "good" with "what I want" or "what I 
78. Even in the greatest stress and under the cruelest oppression and 
violence the individual person remains, on the level of his human nature, free 
to choose. 
79. Vide supra at footnote 66. 
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need"80. If we think and speak in terms of natural rights it is only 
natural to join the concept to a view of morality where it is the very 
choice of an individual person which constitutes the goodness of 
an action or a goal. This is due to the way one is supposed to 
respect the rights of others: even if you do not agree with them that 
their choices are good ones, you ought to respect them because 
they are their own personal choices. This can lead to a deterioration 
of personal autonomy if the people learn to think that everything is 
good as long as it is their own choice, and they have a right to be 
left alone to act according to their free choices. Freedom in the 
sen se of being at liberty to do whatever one may wish grows, 
while freedom in the sense of freedom from undue external and 
sensible affectations can diminish with the misuse of liberty. An 
ideology of natural rights tends, I am afraid, to contribute to an 
undesirable development like this. 
AIso, it is entirely correct to respect the choices of others 
because no one can, after aH, make another person's choices for 
him. But there is a step as short as it is illicit from this correct 
consideration to a fau1ty moral conc1usion, viz. that others ought to 
respect my choices whatever they are because they are my own 
choices. It is rather symptomatic of the human disposition that 
when moral problems are addressed in a language of rights, 
individual persons will think in terms of their own rights, rather 
than in terms of their obligation to respect the rights of others. 
Black says that the natural rights are not like the positive 
entitlements to specific services or goods provided by the state for 
its citizens which can be at odds with the requirements of the 
Natural Law81 . Even if this may be the case where the supposedly 
80. According to Alasdair MACINTYRE: Whose Justice? Which Ratio-
nality?, Duckworth, London 1988, it is one of the important differences 
between classical and modero moral rationality that where the former said 
something was wanted because it was good, the latter says something is good 
because it is wanted. 
81. Vide supra at footnote 67. 
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"true" natural rights are concerned, it is not necessarily so with all 
the different lists of human or natural or soldiers' or children's or 
women's rights, inc1uded in various dec1arations and international 
conventions. Whatever the case may be, it is certain that a natural 
rights ideology can encourage people to start thinking about their 
moral choices in terms of entitlements rather than in terms of 
obligation. That something like this has already happened in the 
"enlightened" West is beyond all doubt. It can easily be seen in the 
attitude of an average citizen of a modero welfare state towards the 
predicament of the less well-off fellow citizens: they are entitled to 
help and care by the government like everybody else, 1 pay my 
taxes like everybody else, why should 1 personally care for any of 
their specific needs? Perhaps from an American viewpoint Black 
cannot see the decline of charity and relief work82 that has taken 
place over the past decades in other parts of the affIuent West 
where interpersonal contact between those in need of help and 
those in a position to help has largely been replaced by an 
impersonal mediation of the state where those with plenty pay 
money to the government for further redistribution to those in 
need. Wonderful evidence of a decisive shift in the paradigmatic 
way of thinking that has taken place are letters to the editor of 
major and minor newspapers: it is striking how many people 
public1Y demand the introduction of new and the protection of old 
rights and entitlements for different categories and groups of 
citizens like the unemployed, the homosexual, the parents of small 
children, the retired and others. What would they do to help an 
unemployed stranger, neighbour, or even a relative, if they had a 
chance? The nature of social solidarity has changed dramatically, 
and the sense of personal responsibility for the welfare of a 
neighbour in need has been replaced by a sense of political indign-
ation at purported shortcomings of the faceless public society. 
82. Vide supra at footnote 68. 
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If the obligation of the Natural Law to assume responsibility for 
the welfare of others is being outcompeted by the natural rights 
paradigm, the latter is profoundly incompatible with the Natural 
Law doctrine because it not only encourages people to think that 
what they may happen to want is good because they want it, but 
because it also takes away from the ordinary citizen his due 
opportunity to exercise charity and beneficence directIy by himself. 
When the state assumes the rOle of all-round charity it robs the 
citizens of their chance to do something personally for the good of 
others as they learn to pass their responsibility to the shoulders of 
the anonymous community. If so, the citizens lose an important 
opportunity to practice virtue in their everyday lives. This again 
puts obstacles to the full actualization of their personal autonomy, 
as that autonomy consists, among other things, in a free subjection 
to one's moral obligation to those for whose welfare one is 
responsible. If an attitude according to which all have rights with 
regard to the state but none have personal responsibility for fellow 
citizens is ingrained among the citizenry, a serious moral deterio-
ration of the entire society can be expected. Citizens will legiti-
mately concentrate on their individual comfort, and it becomes a 
general1y accepted practice to escape personal moral responsibility 
by referring to the public responsibility of the state. If so, it will 
hardly be the freedom which is the goal of the Natural Law which 
the natural rights will facilitate, but the egoistic freedom not to care 
for others. Citizens who could become free to help are enslaved by 
their short sighted desire for easy life and comfort. 
One of the central factors in all this is the one pointed out by 
Black that natural rights do not tell us what is the right way of 
using them for good ends83. Rights are, in other words, formal in 
the sense that they define the external act one has the right to 
undertake. Where the moral substance, i. e. the intention, of the act 
is concerned, rights are silent. Black suggests that this deficit could 
83. vide supra at footnote 70 
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be remedied by an educational effort: one should teach the citizens 
the Natural Law as the moral substance of the natural rights84• Só 
citizens could learn to use rights aright " for the good values which 
morality demands", and to understand that their rights really are 
just an expression for the common good of aH, not for their 
purportedly legitimate right to self-gratification. In this way the 
natural rights would be appropriately defined by and consequently 
subordinate and therefore compatible with the Natural Law which, 
as Black puts it, introduces us to the principIes of things85. For 
these principIes, the natural rights would be, I presume, opera-
tional expressions correctly reflecting the normativity of human 
nature. I have no quarrel with the idea itself: I wish it were ture. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether it carries the argument all the 
way home. A major reason for my doubt is a well-known feature 
of the concept of "right" which tends to receive less attention in the 
rights discussion than it deserves, viz. the fact that if one has a 
right to something it entails that one has a right to it even when it is 
wrong to use one's right to it; consequently, even if it is wrong to 
use one's right on one morallevel, it cannot, on the rights level of 
the discourse, be wrong to claim one's right. So if rights are 
considered as overriding considerations, like Dworkin's "trumps" , 
which in a way belongs to the very notion of rights, then it will be 
right to do wrong now as long as one has a right to do whatever it 
is that is now wrong to do. An example is the right to appeal to a 
higher court: even if one knows that one is wrong it is one's right 
to appeal, never mind how wrong it may be towards the other 
parties or towards the community. Another example, discussed by 
Joseph Raz, is a claimed right to civil disobedience86. - From all 
84. BLACK, op. cit. p. 208 p. 
85. p.209. 
86. Vide Joseph RAZ, The Authority 01 Law. Essays on Law and 
Morality, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1979, p. 262 pp., where the author 
concludes that one nonnalIy cannot have a right to civil disobedience precisely 
because such a right entails that one is entitIed to disobey even when it is 
wrong or otherwise inappropriate to disobey, which would be politicalIy 
unacceptable. 
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this it follows that if an educational programme includes teaching 
in terms of natural or any other rights - as Black clearly advo-
cates87 - it will collide with itself when it at the same time teaches 
to use those rights in the right way: what is the point of speaking in 
terms of rights at all if one must at the same time maintain that one 
of the very things that make rights what they are, i. e. overriding 
and inviolable considerations, is moralIy untenable? An answer put 
forward by Black, and by many others, is that there are important 
practical considerations which make rendering the Natural Law in 
terms of natural human rights give a good polítical pay-off88. To 
this line of argument we shall now tum attention. 
4. THE LANGUAGE OF NATURAL RIGHTS - A "SECOND-BEST 
ALTERNATIVE" TONATURALLAW? 
An observant reader may now raise a question conceming a 
parallel between the modern natural rights discourse and the 
historical distinction between law (lex) and right (ius)89: Is the 
distinction between natural rights and Natural Law anything else 
than the c1assical distinction between lex naturalis and ius naturale? 
Now the distinction between lex and ius is historically ambigous, 
and it has also been argued that e. g. Aquinas often uses the two 
words interchageably. Nevertheless there is one important sense in 
which ius is always quite c1early distinct from lex: ius denotes 
what is the right thing to do in a particular case, whereas lex 
signifies a general rule which defines a right kind of action in the 
abstract. With a view to this distinction, it coud well be argued that 
perhaps the Natural Law represents the category of lex, and the 
natural rights the category of ius. ConsequentIy, using a language 
87. On p. 209 Black says: "the naturallaw has to be educated to extend its 
perspective 10 the common good construed in terms of natural rights". 
88. p. 196 pp. 
89. For a discussion, vide RENTTO: "Ius Gentium: A Lesson from 
Aquinas", The Finnish Yearbook oflnternational Law 1993, pp. 103-134. 
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referring to rights would be nothing but talking about the abstract 
requirements of the Natural Law as they can be applied to 
particular situations. 
Clearly a thought like the one outlined here must be behind 
Black's words when she says that the notion of wrong is common 
property between Natural Law and natural rights: "To say that it is 
not right that somebody do domething is to say that it is wrong that 
they do it. Is this not the same as to say persons have a rig ht that 
somebody not do this wrong to them?"90 I would answer her and 
say: Naturally it is not the same. To equate "he has a right" to "it is 
right for him" is a case of mistaken identity. For to say that a 
person has a right to be treated in a given way mean s something 
more than just to say that it is right that a person be so treated. It 
means that he has a general c1aim to being so treated, no matter 
what, regardless of whether anyone contemplates on treating him 
so or noto In other words, rights-Ianguage is not particular 
language. On the contrary, it is an abstraet language like the 
language with which one speaks about the Natural Law. This 
means that natural rights cannot be particular renderings of the 
requirements of the Natural Law. AH they can be is less abstraet 
renderings of the general principIes of the Natural Law. The 
question is whether they are, as such, appropriate for the purpose 
of interpreting the intention of the Natural Law. 
Aecording to Black, it is, regardless of the philosophical 
strength of the connection between natural rights and Natural Law, 
important to argue for natural rights as something that bears a 
relationship to the Natural Law, because the coneept of natural 
rights is so practical: "rights have consequences of great magnitude 
for modern society and its citizens"91. Rights are useful, not least 
because they provide an ingenious method for resolving conflicts: 
with rights we have rights-holders in an adversarial position where 
90. BLACK, p. 204. 
91. p. 197. 
312 JUHA-PEKKA RENITO 
they can go to court and demand that it give each party his right; 
and what is more, rights put the citizen in an adversarial position 
towards the state, which makes it easier to protect the individual 
citizen against the overwhelming power of the government92. 
Rights facilitate making legitimate claims. As Black points out, 
rights discourse has a strong rhetorical impact, and it carries the 
argument home more easily than an argument from duties or 
obligations93 . Using the language of rights is, in short, an 
efficacious method of arguing for the requirements of the Natural 
Law, as well as ofputting it into effect. 
If we put it this way, natural rights are an instrument, a method, 
a means to the goal s of the Natural Law. The significance of 
natural rights is functional, they are desirable because they are 
good for a purpose, not because they are good in themselves. 
From this viewpoint it is also plausible to argue that even if it 
necessarily does not make good philosophical sen se to equate 
natural rights to the Natural Law, it nevertheless makes good 
practical sen se to use the language of natural human rights for 
political purposes, both in national and internacional moral 
discourse, because it is the best, perhaps even the only practical1y 
feasible, way ofreaching the desirable goals defined by the Natural 
Law step by step, second only to a direct implementation of that 
Law itself, which is impossible by fiat94• The natural rights are 
something we can actualize instead of the Natural Law for the 
purpose of instilling the latter in the hearts of meno For want of 
anything better, if we are to actualize the Natural Law, we must 
actualize the natural rights. So construed, the argument for natural 
92. p. 197 p. 
93. p. 198 p. 
94. This is precisely what Andrew LEVINE, op. supra cit. holds, vide 
especially p. 144 pp. - Authors like SHARMA, op. cit. and SINHA, op. cit., 
come to a similar conclusion: even if the Westem conception oC natural rights 
perhaps is not entirely adequate in theory from a non-Westem viewpoint, it 
stiU is a valuable method to use for the purpose oC improving the world. 
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rights turns into an argument from practical necessity, not entirely 
unlike the argument of John Finnis for a general obligation to obey 
the positive law: once a positive legal system has been formed, it is 
practically necessary if it is to reach its goal, i. e. the common 
good, defined by the Natural Law, that all its subjects abide by the 
law in all situations covered by the law, simply because there is no 
practically efficacious alternative to it95. A system of rights is 
something that can be imposed on a real society of real people, and 
one can hope that once the people have learned to cherish and 
respect each other's rights they will grow to realize their 
fundamental obligations according to the Natural Law. In this way 
rights may have an educational function, too: they impose on 
citizens a heteronomous increment of virtuous conduct, which they 
are to develop into a full-blown personal virtue. 
But Andrew Levine suggests, referring to Rousseau's way of 
conceiving society, that human rights are really a poor substitute 
for a proper education which would genuinely transform "the 
atomic individual s into a body politic where ... human dignity is 
inscribed in each person's will"96. According to him, human rights 
are needed merely as a corrective to the predominant liberalistic 
ideology which in itself reduces one's fellow men to nothing but 
means to one's individual goals. If that ideology could be replaced 
by a better one, human rights would "drop away for want of 
sufficient reason "97. AIso Black, we have seen, underlines the 
need to complete the natural rights ideology with a conscious 
prograrnme of educating the citizens to understand and follow the 
Natural Law from which the rights supposedly spring. 1, for that, 
would go even further than Levine and suggest that if the natural 
95. Vide John FINNIS, "The Authority oC Law in the Predicament oC 
Contemporary Social Theory", Notre Dame Journal 01 Law. Ethícs and Public 
Poliey I (1984), pp. 115-137. and idem: "Law as Co-ordination, Ratio Juris 2 
(1989), pp. 97-104. 
96. LEVINE,op. cit., p. 146 
97. Ibídem. 
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human rights are at the core of the educational programme, that 
education may more likely only deepen the hold of stark liberalistic 
individualism on men than modify it to a more compassionate and 
virtuous direction. 
1 am afraid that teaching people human natural rights from 
cradle to grave will produce people who more readily than ever 
make claims against others rather than take responsibility for their 
needs, litigate against one another rather than seek compromise and 
harmony, demand concessions from others rather than make them 
to others, seek protection for their individual right to self-
gratification without intrusion by others rather than care for the 
wellbeing of their fellows, and consider the state as a con tractor or 
an insurance agency against which they have rights and from 
which they are entitled to benefits instead of conceiving the 
political cornmunity as a joint enterprise for the common good of 
all. A human rights ideology encourages one to take pride in one's 
humanity, instead of exercising humility. It makes one believe that 
one's self is the centre of the universe instead of just a small grain 
of sand under the wheel of existence. In short, it makes men think 
that the world exists for the purpose of stilling their wants and 
needs, whereas the profound insight of the Natural Law tradition is 
that the world has an end in which the human beings have a share 
and for which they have their specific responsibility to carry out in 
the grand scheme of the universe. The Natural Law assigns man a 
limited space, a place within the world, a status, and the basic 
insight which sets man free is a realization of the fact that he cannot 
surpass those limits but must subdue himself to them. It is this 
liberating status which the natural human rights threaten to rob 
from him, in order to enslave him to his passions. This is 
particulary dangerous in the international context where newly 
independent and only recentIy self-conscious nations are imposed 
an alien reifying individualism which'can pull the rug from under 
the traditional way of life without giving any solid direction for a 
new way of life ín return, without giving the new individual 
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person a place and status he can understand and handle and live in 
a satisfactory manner98. 
When one studies non-Western authors who at the same time 
express their doubts as to the philosophical validity of the idea of 
natural human rights and nevertheless profess their belief in the 
importance of their continued propagation and implementation, one 
can easi1y see that the common denominator between the pro-
human rights attitudes is a shared awareness of the fact that many 
governments, Western and non-Western alike, faíl to care for their 
subjects or citizens according to the requirement of the Natural 
Law for the common good of aH. What is asked for is not so much 
that people should adopt the Western conception of human rights, 
but that they should learn to stand up against a government which 
misuses its authoritative position for promotion of selfish interests 
and uses its subjects as means to private winning rather than as 
ends in themselves. The critical question is how to protect the 
meek of the land from the excesses of the strong. For this purpose 
it is useful to resort to a language of human rights, even if one has 
no faith in the moral superiority of the Western liberal way of life 
which those rights reflect. But, one may ask, would it not be better 
if a clear difference were made between the normative human 
nature and the claims against its violations by unjust governments? 
Before we close our inquiry we shall consider an argument by 
the jusnaturalist John Finnis, designed to show why for most 
practical purposes it is not only possible and politically useful but 
also morally correct to paraphrase ourstatements concerning the 
Natural Law in a language of natural rights. The argument merits 
98. Of course one must bear in mind that it is not necessarily the ideas 
themselves which cause a change in the way of life. In private discussions with 
colleagues from mainland China 1 have recurrently heard the c1aim that. 
unawares. China has in fact westernized much more than it is ever willing to 
admito due to the long-standing public policy of reducing the number of 
children in the fami1y. The one child policy has resulted in a growth of a new 
generation of spoilt and self-centred individuals. 1 am toldo who have no respect 
for the communal values of tbe old generations! 
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separate treatment because it stems from a recent rendering of 
Natural Law theory which has been as controversial as it has been 
influential in the past decade or so. The Natural Law consists for 
Finnis99, to begin with, in a set of basic goods which are equally 
self-evident and equally basic, and each and every one of them 
primary in the sense that none of them can be reduced to any of the 
others: the basic goods are mutually incommensurable. The 
Thomasian first principIe of the Natural Law, that good is to be 
done and pursued and evil avoided, is the fust principIe of practical 
reason, and the basic goods are its material content: they define 
what kinds of things are goods to be done and pursued by a human 
being. But moral reason demands more than just doing and 
pursuing good and avoiding evil: it requires that one, on the 
whole, seek an integral fulfilment of human good in its different 
aspects, i. e. that one seek a whole good for the whole human 
being instead of merely partial goods for different parts of mano To 
fulfil this requirement one must abide by a set of principIes which 
define practical reasonableness. Of major importance among these 
principIes is the one which specifies that an integral fulfilment of 
human good demands that one must never act directIy against a 
basic human good, be it one's own or someone eIse's. That one's 
action would violate a persons's basic good is in itself a reason not 
to take such action, a reason which could only be overridden by a 
greater good yielded by the action. But such a justification is 
rationally impossible because the basic goods are aH primary and 
incommensurable. Therefore it is always wrong to act against 
someone's basic goodH)(). It foHows that it is an organic part of the 
99. For a concise statement of the main ingredients of the theory, vide 
Germain GRISEZ-Joseph BOYLE-John FINNIS, "Practica! PrincipIes, Moral 
Truth, and Ultimate Ends, The American Journal 01 Jurisprudence 32 (1987), 
pp. 99-151. 
100. Vide FINNIS, Moral Absolutes. Tradition, Revision. and Truth. The 
Catholic University of America Press, Washington, OC, 1991, especially p. 
31 pp. 
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Natural Law that sorne actions, like taking a person's life, are 
necessarily evil in themselves because they seek damage to 
someone's integral fulfilment of human good. Consequently they 
are absolutely forbidden by the Natural Law. Thus it is the duty of 
everyone not to violate anyone's basic good. From a different 
viewpoint, it is practically necessary for the flourishing of an 
individual human life that other individuals respect a person in 
every aspect of his basic reality. In other words, human beings 
need that others fulfil their duty according to the Natural Law. At 
this point rights enter the field: the notion of having natural rights 
reflects the basic natural human needslOl and the practical 
necessity of their protection against violation, if the person is to 
reach integral fulfllment of human good. 
Finnis recognizes that duties and obligations have "a more 
strategic explanatory role than the concept of rights"102. But 
nevertheless, rights are not less important: for Finnis the rights are 
an integral part of the cornmon good, required by the Natural 
Law l03. Lists of human rights included in international decla-
rations and conventions are ways of "sketching the outlines of 
the common good, the various aspects of well-being in com-
munity"104. When one refers to these aspects of human good in 
terms of rights, one underlines the basic requirement of practical 
reason that "each and everyone's well-being, in each of its basic 
aspects, must be considered and favoured at all times by those 
responsible for co-ordinating the common life"105. Finnis does not 
address the problem which consists in the likely contribution of the 
natural rights ideology to a more egoistic, claims-oriented and 
conflict-fostering moral attitude. But instead he argues that rights-
101. As opposed to the benefit and choice theories of rights, vide FINNIS, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1980, p. 205. 
102. Ibidem p. 210. 
103. p. 210 pp. 
104. p.214. 
105. Ibidem. 
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talk can, quite on the contrary, improve the moral stature of 
members of the community when it educates them to the insight 
that sorne moral actions are absolutely good or absolutely evil and 
that it is not reasonable to calculate about such actions in the 
consequentialist tenns of whether they produce a greater or smaller 
amount of good or bad outcomes106: a good outcome will never 
justify an evil action107. This 1 find a sound moral argument, and 
perhaps it can in sorne context outweigh the argument from 
increased egoism. But we must realize that both considerations are 
relative: the natural rights ideology has certain morally beneficent 
features relative to a utilitarian ideology, but other morally deficient 
features relative to a Natural Law doctrine which builds on the 
notions of responsibility and obligation. 
Finnis' conception of natural rights is like Black's, as for him, 
too, the primary source of those rights is the Natural Law which 
requires that the common good of all be sought. He will not say 
that the human rights are limited by the common good, as it is part 
and parcel of the common good that each and everyone enjoy his 
freedom to seek his own integral fulfilment in human good108. But 
rights are not everything: they are limited, not only by other rights 
and the rights of others, but also by other considerations relevant 
for integral human fulfilment in community, describable in tenns 
of "public morality " , "public order", "public health" and the 
like109. Therefore rights clearly are not the whole common good 
but merely a part of it. As a consequence, if we take Finnis 
seriously all way through, it will be morally wrong for a 
government to promote civil or human rights as if they, instead of 
the common good, constituted the end of the polity. No statute or 
policy is morally valid merely because it promotes rights, civil or 
natural. Hence rights are not, and cannot be, the ultimate moral 
106. p. 221. 
107. Cf. ANNIS, Moral Absolutes, p. 54 p. 
108. Natural Law and Natural Ríghts, p. 218. 
109. Ibídem p. 216 pp. 
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standard, however useful they may be for the common good, or 
however practical the language of rights may be for expressing 
thoughts about the Natural Law. The language of rights may be a 
second-best altemative to an unfeasible direct appeal to the Natural 
Law, but only in suitable circumstances. A circumstance which 
makes a resort to a language of inalienable rights appropriate is 
when it can work against an unjust govemment. But where 
govemment is by and large just, its propriety is, 1 would claim, far 
from evident. 
5. APOSTROPHY 
Despite the intemational predominance of the natural rights 
ideology, the notion of natural human rights is philosophically 
problematic. The natural rights appear primarily to be a device for 
the prevention and repression of actions against the Natural Law 
that defines the human nature, and being a device they are not 
natural in themselves but only in the extended sen se that they are a 
product of existing natural agents, i. e. human beings. Therefore it 
would be morally appropriate to realize that they are more likely 
part of the positive law: perhaps they could be characterized as a 
modem ius gentium, a set of humanly invented considerations 
which enjoya general but conditioned validity within the context of 
the present-day human predicament. 
Conceiving of the human rights as a positive order of ius 
gentium, rather than a natural order of Human Nature, would help 
to keep apart their polítical usefulness and their philosophical 
doubtfulness, as well as it would save the people from a moral 
reindoctrination to a self-centred new moralíty of claims and 
conflict oriented individualismo Then it would be possible to tell 
the people that it is the political duty of the govemment to let them 
lead their lives freely on their own, and that it is the civic duty of 
the citizens to carry out their individual responsibility for the 
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common good by, among other things, taking initiative for and 
participating in their own government if their protection against a 
tyrannous state establishment so requires - and aH this without 
making them believe that their nature demands absolute and 
inalienable respect from others for their any wish to do whatever 
they may happen to like to do. 
The international human rights discourse would also be well 
served by a conscious shift from the myth of their "naturalness" 
and "inalienability" to acknowledging their more humble "human-
ness": that they are tools deviced by the human reason for a limited 
purpose in its quest for the common good of aH. Then many of the 
problems related to their philosophical rootlessness in various 
cultural contexts like the ones we have reviewed here would turn 
out irrelevant for their practical function. Perhaps the natural rights 
could then work for a genuinely better world, unlike to-day when 
they work more for the dissolution of traditional structures in order 
to support the superiority of the Western ego and make the non-
Western world more susceptible of becoming a grateful market 
area for the products of the industry which lives off the newly 
created human subspecies of consumers of individual gratification. 
